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Students of welfare state politics
would probably agree that, on balance,
a large number of veto players 
tends to inhibit not only the expansion of benefits
but also their radical curtailment.
(Starke, 2006: 115)
After the golden age of welfare state development in Europe, the glorious thirty years from
1945 to 1974, perceptions changed and the welfare state was interpreted to be in crisis. One
solution to the crisis was a neo-liberal approach emphasizing privatization and retrenchment.
And at least rhetorically this perspective gained ground during the 1980s in Northwestern
Europe and during the 1990s in the newly emerging market economies of Central and Eastern
Europe. However, on the whole, social science literature has been more concerned about trying
to explain welfare state resilience to change than identifying retrenchment even if parts of the
literature do argue for such a perspective. This seeming contradiction within the scholarly com-
munity calls for a more precise definition of all three import concepts: What should be under-
stood by neo-liberal reform or a neo-liberal approach? Which welfare policies are in question?
And what parts of Europe are being investigated? Furthermore, the time perspective is crucial.
From the perspective of the late 2000s this paper argues first that neo-liberalism in the
form of the so-called Washington consensus is no longer promoted by international organiza-
tions. Social policies are no longer regarded as a burden on economies, but rather as investment
in human capital. Hence, we are now beyond neo-liberalism. Secondly, the widespread welfare
reforms in Europe must be distinguished according to welfare regime. Thus, the paper discusses
welfare reform within five different trajectories: former state-socialist states, Continental
Europe, Atlantic Europe, Southern Europe and Scandinavia. Although the number and
demarcations of welfare regimes are contested (for an excellent overview see Powell and
Barrientos, 2008) it is a widespread perspective and a good tool to order European welfare
states. Hence, I agree with Francis Castles and Herbert Obinger (2008: 321) when they write:
“Our main conclusions are that country clustering is, if anything, more pronounced than in the
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past, that it is, in large part, structurally determined and that the EU now contains a quite dis-
tinct post-Communist family of nations.”
A superficial overview of spending on social protection in both relative and absolute terms
from 1980 (1990 in Eastern Europe) to 2005 reveals no signs of retrenchment in any regime.
But such summary indicators may mask a different distributional profile of benefits and an
increase in risks and coverage. Therefore, the remainder of the paper discusses in more detail
particular welfare reforms within each of the five welfare regimes. It is concluded that problems
of welfare state development differ within the different regimes, but a strong commitment to
welfare can be identified everywhere. However, within a bifurcated system where the middle
class enjoys generous protection, the marginalized are subjected to increased obligations and
reduced entitlements.
Keywords: Welfare Reform, Europe, Welfare State, Social Policy, Social Investment State
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Introduction
Western European theories traditionally
have stressed that the public interest
is better served when providing welfare services
is accepted as a state responsibility.
However, this has become somewhat muddy
as a result of the neoliberal tendencies of the 1980s
(Bordas, 2001: 226)
In Western Europe the welfare state was part of the post WW II social set-
tlement during the so-called trente glorieuse, but with the oil crises during the
1970s it became contested, and in 1981 OECD declared the welfare state to be in
crisis. This was the beginning of a neoliberal turn in politics across the globe.
Looking back at its development from 2010, a very complex picture emerges
from the social science literature. Crudely, political economics has had a tenden-
cy to view the changes within post-industrial welfare states as indeed going
down a liberal road of retrenchment, privatization and marketization. Thus,
Jasmin Lorch (2007) entitled a paper ‘the neoliberal retreat of the welfare state in
Europe and the developing world’ and began by stating that,  “[d]ue to budget
constraints most European countries have been experiencing some form of the
retreat of the welfare state since the early 80s. Partly in reaction to this neo-liber-
al tendency…” (See also Harvey, 2005; Ryner, 2008). Differently, part of the
political science literature has pointed to welfare states’ resilience to change
(Esping-Andersen, 1996; Pierson, 1994; 1996; Starke, 2006). Yet, again the
majority of comparative, institutional, and sociologically oriented literature has
pointed to various degrees of change such as the recalibrating, recasting, renew-
ing or reforming of welfare states, but concluding that these changes have led to
a survival of the welfare state (Bolukbasi, 2009; Clasen, 2000; Clegg, 2007;
Drahoukoupil, 2007; Ferrera and Rhodes, 2000a; Ferrera, Hemerijck and
Rhodes, 2000; Kuhnle and Alestalo, 2000; Leibfried and Obinger, 2000).
How is it possible for social scientists to reach such opposite conclusions?
In order to clarify and qualify the discussion it is important to be more precise
about time, space and content. Following the reactions to the first oil crisis of
the mid 1970s ending the ‘golden years’ the advice given to governments from
international organizations such as the OECD was indeed of a neo-liberal bent
(OECD, 1981). Some governments, at least judged by their rhetoric, did also
speak against the welfare state—particularly conservative ones like those of
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Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA. Hence, the 1980s
in Western Europe and the 1990s in Eastern Europe can, at least to some extent,
be characterized as neoliberal. However, since around 1997 the Washington-
based international organizations have stopped arguing for a neoliberal agenda,
and are now pursuing a social investment perspective (Jenson, 2010). This per-
spective is still productivist, but certainly not neoliberal, as they are arguing for
enhanced public intervention in health care, education and basic social security. 
It is thus important to be precise about what point in time we are observing
and also where. Europe consists of (at least) five different welfare regimes clus-
tered geographically, and with different trajectories of welfare reform and wel-
fare retrenchment. The most clear cut neoliberal case is the East European trans-
formation from state socialism to capitalism beginning after the fall of the Berlin
Wall in November 1989; and the Atlantic experience (UK and Ireland) was a
contender for a neoliberal turn, even if many observers when looking back at
the 1980s had problems actually identifying such a change. Viewing the devel-
opment in Southern Europe following the defeat of military dictatorship and
the installation of democratic rule in the 1970s, we saw a rapid expansion of
welfare entitlements, including the creation of public, universal health care sys-
tems. In Continental Northwestern Europe the frozen landscape of the 1990s
may have to some extent been succeeded by some retrenchment and marketiza-
tion during the 2000s. Finally, there have been changes to welfare provision in
Scandinavia, but nothing that would qualify as a neoliberal turn. Below, a peri-
odization will be applied which considers the 1980s and 1990s as a period of
uncertainty, and the 2000s as a period marking the turn toward a new welfare
state settlement labeled the “social investment” state.
Furthermore, disagreement about the developments made may stem from
comparing apples with oranges. It is very likely that reforms of social assistance
and unemployment schemes have taken another direction than that of family
policy; and pension reforms may look very different from health care reforms.
Thus, it is important to be precise about which welfare sectors are being ana-
lyzed and compared over time and across space.
These considerations taken together make it a formidable task to assess
welfare reform in Europe with an eye toward neoliberalism. Ideally the develop-
ment over three decades in five welfare regimes with regard to 10 or more spe-
cific social policy areas should be analyzed. Finally, the whole exercise hinges on
which definition of neoliberalism is applied. Obviously, the ambition of this
paper is more limited. It provides results from a selective—but certainly not
arbitrary—reading of the literature on welfare reform with an emphasis on the
most recent development and most important changes, considering policy areas
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within the regimes. The reasoning is very much in line with what is expressed in
the paper by Linda Weiss on this issue where globalization is interpreted as
demanding rather than discouraging state intervention (Weiss, 2009). It will be
concluded that problems of welfare state development are different within the
different regimes, but that everywhere there can be identified a strong commit-
ment to welfare within a new welfare settlement, which is identified as the social
investment state. However, within a bifurcated system where the middle class
enjoys generous protection, the marginalized are subjected to increased obliga-
tions and reduced entitlements.
Beyond Neoliberalism?
Many have associated neoliberalism with the so-called Washington
Consensus as summed up by the Center for International Development at
Harvard University (2007). The phrase ‘Washington Consensus’ is today a very
popular and often pilloried term in debates about trade and development. It is
often seen as synonymous with ‘neo-liberalism’ and ‘globalization.’ As the
phrase’s originator, John Williamson, says: 
Audiences the world over seem to believe that this signifies a set of neo-liberal
policies that have been imposed on hapless countries by the Washington-based
international financial institutions and have led them to crisis and misery.
There are people who cannot utter the term without foaming at the mouth!
(Williamson, 2002) 
Initially the Washington Consensus referred to is as “the lowest common
denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institu-
tions to Latin American countries as of 1989” (Williamson, 2002), and it grew
out of a conference in 1990 at the Institute for International Economics on eco-
nomic policy reform in Latin America and the Caribbean. Williamson, in his
conclusion, summed up the conference by stating that Washington had reached
a substantial degree of consensus regarding the following 10 policy instruments:
fiscal discipline; public expenditure priorities in education and health; tax
reform; positive but moderate market-determined interest rates; competitive
exchange rates, liberal trade policies, openness to direct foreign investment; pri-
vatization; deregulation; and protection of property rights (Williamson, 1990
cited in Burki and Perry, 1998: 7; see also Lee and Mathews, 2009). 
It is true that the IMF and the World Bank promoted neo-liberal policies
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during the 1980s and most of the 1990s, but it seems that that no longer is the
case. And as early as 1998 the World Bank published a document entitled
Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter (Burki and Perry, 1998).
In it is expressed that what is labeled “first generation reforms”—those follow-
ing the stipulated Washington Consensus—were expected to “significantly
reduce poverty and inequality… [but] this has not occurred.” Instead “wage dif-
ferentials between skilled and non-skilled labor appear to have widened…which
has resulted in poverty rates that are unacceptably high. In addition, economic
insecurity for the poor and middle classes, linked to job insecurity and income
volatility, has tended to increase” (Burki and Perry, 1998: 1, emphasis added). It
is suggested that the situation now calls for ‘institutional’ reforms. The global-
ization of national economies, the implementation of the first generation
reforms, and the process of democratization in Latin America and the
Caribbean are contributing to a rise in the demand for institutional reforms’
along three dimensions:
1. There is an increasing demand for institutional reforms on the part of the
private sector, which now competes in a global marketplace and has realized
that its profitability or competitiveness is affected by the quality and efficien-
cy of the delivery of financial and public services, the quality of education,
and the effectiveness of the judicial system.
2. The rapid growth of volatile capital flows has increased the demand for insti-
tutional reforms that may help mitigate the risks associated with this trend.
3. Globalization has increased the demand for institutions that can help reduce
income inequality and provide social safety nets for people who are rendered
more vulnerable in the new competitive environment (Burki and Perry,
1998: 2).
This perspective has been labeled “after-neoliberalism” and is viewed to
emphasize a social investment approach to the developmental welfare state
(Jenson, 2010).
When it came to Europe and welfare state developments, neoliberalism
meant privatization and retrenchment, less instead of more government; and
more self-reliance as argued by Margaret Thatcher in the UK in the 1980s or by
IMF in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Neoliberal trends
in Europe have also been associated with the creation of the Economic and
Monetary Union project of the early 1990s within the European Union member
states. In what follows the thesis of neoliberalism is tested against welfare state
developments.
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Development of Social Expenditure
The most simple and, admitted superficial, way of assessing welfare state
cutbacks is to view total social spending either relatively, set against the GDP, or
in absolute terms—per capita. The tables below do that for clusters of European
countries. Throughout the paper welfare development and welfare reform are
discussed with reference to five different trajectories: former state-socialist states,
Continental Europe, Atlantic Europe, Southern Europe and Scandinavia.
Although the number and demarcations of welfare regimes are contested (for an
excellent overview see Powell and Barrientos, 2008). It is a widespread perspec-
tive and a good tool to order European welfare states (Abrahamson, 1999a).
Concerning the perhaps most contested cluster—that of Central and Eastern
Europe—I agree with Francis Castles and Herbert Obinger (2008: 321) when
they write, “[o]ur main conclusions are that country clustering is, if anything,
more pronounced than in the past, that it is, in large part, structurally deter-
mined and that the EU now contains a quite distinct post-Communist family of
nations.”
In relative terms the Visegrad countries have caught up with the OECD
average when it comes to social spending, but in absolute terms they are much
less affluent, and hence spent much less on welfare polices than an average
OECD country did. Yet the Visegrad countries have expanded their spending
considerably from 1990 to 2005 (between 50 pct. and 250 pct.).
During the Thatcher and Major years (1979-1997) the UK expanded on
social expenditure both relatively and absolutely, and she has continued to do so
under Blair (New Labour). The UK has followed the OECD average for 25 years
except for the mid 1980s. In absolute terms, Ireland has increased its social
spending by 300 percent during this period of time and is now at par with the
UK and the OECD average. Continental Europe stands out as a big spender
when it comes to social policy, generally spending about 50 percent more than
the OECD average, and with Luxembourg as the biggest spender of all in
absolute terms. Most countries doubled their spending from 1980 to 2005.
The Scandinavian countries more than doubled their social policy effort
from 1980 to 2005 in absolute terms, while relatively speaking they progressed
moderately during this period of time. In relative terms Central and Eastern
EU-member states are small spenders with between 13 to 18 percent of the GDP
devoted to social protection, and many states spent relatively less in 2005 than
they did in 2000. However, in absolute terms they all spent more in 2005 than
they did in 2000; but the dispersion in absolute spending is striking. The poorer
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Table 1. Total Social Expenditure as Share of GDP 1980-2005
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Visegrad countries
Czech republic .. .. 16.0 18.2 19.8 19.5
Hungary .. .. .. .. 20.0 22.5
Poland .. .. 14.9 22.6 20.5 21.0
Slovak republic .. .. .. 18.6 17.9 16,6
Atlantic Europe
Ireland 16.7 21.3 14.9 15.7 13.6 16.7
The UK 16.7 19.8 17.0 20.2 19.2 21.3
Continental Europe
Austria 22.5 23.8 23.9 26.5 26.4 27.2
Belgium 23.5 26.0 24.9 26.2 25.3 26.4
France 20.8 26.0 25.1 28.6 27.9 29.2
Germany 22.7 23.2 22.3 26.5 26.2 26.7
Luxembourg 20.6 20.2 19.1 20.8 19.1 23.2
The Netherlands 24.8 25.3 25.6 23.8 19.8 20.9
Scandinavia
Denmark 24.8 23.2 25.1 28.9 25.8 27.1
Finland 18.0 22.5 24.2 30.9 24.3 26.1
Norway 16.9 17.8 22.3 23.3 21.3 21.6
Sweden 27.1 29.4 30.2 32.1 28.5 29.4
Southern Europe
Greece 10.2 16.0 16.5 17.3 19.2 20.5
Italy 18.0 20.8 20.0 19.9 23.2 25.0
Portugal 10.2 10.4 12.9 17.0 19.6 23.1
Spain 15.6 17.8 19.9 21.4 20.3 21.2
Central and Eastern European Union Non-OECD Members
Bulgaria .. .. .. .. .. 16.0
Estonia .. .. .. .. 14.0 12.7
Cyprus .. .. .. .. 14.8 18.4
Latvia .. .. .. .. 15.3 12.4
Lithuania .. .. .. .. 15.8 13.1
Malta .. .. .. .. 16.9 18.4
Romania .. .. .. .. 13.2 14.2
Slovenia .. .. .. .. 24.2 23.0
OECD 16.0 17,7 18.1 19.9 19.3 20.6
EU-25 .. .. .. .. 26.5 27.3
Source: OECD (2009); Eurostat (2009a).
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Table 2. Total Social Expenditure per Capita at Constant PPP US $ 1980-2005
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Visegrad countries
Czech republic .. .. 2.322 2.524 2.964 3.523
Hungary .. .. .. .. 2.459 3.455
Poland .. .. 1.093 1.833 2.164 2.590
Slovak republic .. .. .. 1.741 1.964 2.291
Atlantic Europe
Ireland 1.891 2.635 2.346 3.010 3.886 5.723
The UK 2.769 3.583 3.567 4.546 4.963 6.094
Continental Europe
Austria 4.316 4.906 5.640 6.745 7.683 8.285
Belgium 4.458 5.175 5.697 6.394 6.963 7.695
France 3.745 4.930 5.436 6.424 7.030 7.696
Germany 3.581 3.935 4.371 6.261 6.785 7.109
Luxembourg 4.995 5.492 7.167 8.796 10.529 13.996
The Netherlands 4.764 5.049 5.857 5.907 5,813 6.355
Scandinavia
Denmark 4.685 5.040 5.817 7.381 7.431 8.176
Finland 3.060 4.256 5.296 6.362 6.237 7.476
Norway 3.624 4.428 5.924 7.226 7.683 8.468
Sweden 5.202 6.269 7.114 7.510 7.913 9.094
Southern Europe
Greece 1.553 2.369 2.538 2.763 3.523 4.600
Italy 3.124 3.919 4.375 4.637 5.948 6.477
Portugal 988 1.026 1.693 2.419 3.343 3.974
Spain 2.011 2.407 3.327 3.811 4.326 4.928
Central and Eastern European Union Non-OECD Members
Bulgaria .. .. .. .. .. 373
Estonia .. .. .. .. 623 896
Cyprus .. .. .. .. 2.148 2.918
Latvia .. .. .. .. 547 558
Lithuania .. .. .. .. 559 781
Malta .. .. .. .. 1.845 1.973
Romania .. .. .. .. 238 260*
Slovenia .. .. .. .. 2.613 2.671*
OECD 2.642 3.152 3.662 4.332 4.821 5.628
EU-25 .. .. .. .. 5.359 5.964
Note: * - 2006.
Source: OECD (2009); Eurostat (2009a).
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states spent 260-900 € per capita while the richer ones spent 2000-3000 € per
capita.
From a social expenditure perspective it is not possible to identify any signs
of retrenchment within European welfare states, a finding consistent with that of
German colleagues from Bremen. As concluded by Heinz Rothgang, Herbert
Obinger and Stephan Leibfried (2006: 254), “…, the trajectory of social expen-
diture since 1980 suggests that the welfare state is not in retreat” (see also
Leibfried and Obinger, 2003). Having said that, it was also revealed that com-
mitment to social protection is not very developed in the small Baltic states and
in Romania and Bulgaria.
Welfare Reforms in Europe
This section assesses the degree and direction of welfare reform within the
five different welfare regimes following the sequence adopted in the previous
section. Regarding Central and Eastern Europe and the UK the focus is on the
period of uncertainty in the 1980s and 1990s, while the most recent develop-
ment is in focus regarding the other regimes. The section concludes with some
attempts toward crosscutting reflections.
Central and Eastern Europe: neoliberalism and beyond
The transition of post-communist regimes to capitalism
started at a time when the global hegemony of neoliberalism
was at its height.
Thus, the neoliberal premises of the Washington consensus
and respective advisors shaped the policies aimed at radical,
systematic transformation from non-capitalist regimes
to capitalist ones. 
The transition to capitalism was designed to be essentially market-led.
(Drahoukoupil, 2007: 408)
There can be no doubt that welfare reform in Eastern Europe took place
within a climate of neoliberalism as indicated by the epigraph above. Jan
Drahoukoupil (2007) identified two qualitatively different phases of develop-
ment of the neoliberal transformation in the four Visegrad countries, which he
labeled: the Klausian welfare national state, and the Porterian workfare postna-
tional regime. “The Klausian state focused on stimulating local capital and co-
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constituted a growth dynamic largely based on the environment of soft credit
and state spending, including relative generous social policies. …, in spite of the
radical neoliberal rhetoric, the Czech strategy of post-socialist transformation
can be characterized as social-liberal” (Drahoukoupil, 2007: 402). Hence, even
when the development saw strong elements of privatization and marketization,
it did not dismantle social citizenship. The reform package included: an anti-
inflationary policy (monetary restraint), price liberalization, the freeing of
imports, strict wage control, the legalization of collective bargaining, and “a
comparatively very generous and elaborate social and health-care system”
(Drahoukoupil, 2007: 411). Thus, he characterized the four Visegrad countries
as welfare states, and explained that an elaborate system of social provision was
introduced in order to guarantee social peace during the process of post-socialist
transformation. Development in this early stage can “hardly be identified as lais-
sez-faire” (Drahoukoupil, 2007: 414).
However, from 1998 and onward these countries experienced a ‘sea change’
toward externally oriented competitive policies of the supply-side kind. Yet, wel-
fare provisions were still maintained even if a significant active turn can be iden-
tified. Similarly, Maria Bordas (2001: 232) from Hungary maintained that
“[w]elfare privatization in post-communist countries has been fairly limited.” 
If we differentiate welfare policies and consider the two most important
elements, two opposite tendencies have appeared in Eastern and Central
Europe: Regarding pensions: a radial alteration with a liberal strategy (except in
Czech Republic and Slovenia) because eight of the countries converted their
pay-as-you-go systems into multi-pillar models with capital-funded compo-
nents. Hence, ‘many of the redistributive elements of the old socialist system
were eliminated’ writes Björn Hacker (2009: 154). But, regarding health care the
basic principle of universalism was preserved. In most of the Central and
Eastern European countries “the right of free access to health care provision is
fixed in the constitution” (Hacker, 2009: 157). Concerning the Eastern and
Central European welfare regime with respect to unemployment policy it has
leaned toward being supply-side, being focused on the employability of work-
ers—which is a productivist approach, but hardly a neoliberal one.
So, even when Central and Eastern Europe from the outset could be con-
sidered the most obvious contenders for demonstrating a neoliberal develop-
ment this does not hold true for social protection, and this is most probably
explained by politicians listening to their constituencies (or fearing them) as
shown by Byung-Yeon Kim and Andrew Roberts (2009).
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Atlantic Europe: the Example of Thatcherism and the UK Third Way1
Another obvious contender for a neoliberal turn in Europe would be the
United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher. Ideologically, the Conservative
Party taking office in 1979 signaled a profound change in the approach to wel-
fare provision, and the new Prime Minister became not only associated with but
actually personified the new times dubbed by some as ‘after the golden age.’ A
common reference point in the political debate during the 1980s was
Reaganomics and Thatcherism indicating that liberal economics and political
conservatism were (again?) back behind the steering wheel of the modern state,
at least in the US and the UK. The rhetoric of the various Thatcher governments
certainly was anti-public intervention and extreme to the extent of denouncing
the existence of a common identity, as expressed in the famous quote: “Who is
society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there
are families and no government can do anything except through people and
people look to themselves first” (Thatcher, 1987). During this period of time,
critical scholarship amplified this impression of a government seriously devoted
to rolling back the welfare state and substituting it with free market solutions in
a privatized environment (see e.g. Jessop et al., 1984 and numerous articles in
Critical Social Policy). And, indeed, it was. Rodney Lowe sums up the situation
prevailing in the late 1970s as such: “To many, in brief, the welfare state was
beginning to appear not only politically but also morally bankrupt...the New
Right was also inherently hostile to state welfare…the New right was committed
to—just like the Poor Law reformers of the 1830s—to a ‘remoralising’ of soci-
ety” (Lowe, 1993: 303-4). But he then goes on to ask how effectively the classic
welfare state was actually destroyed during this period, and he identifies two
major casualties: One is the commitment to full employment; the other is cor-
poratism. Nevertheless, “the social services remained largely unscathed…
despite the explicit commitment of Conservative governments after 1979 to ‘roll
back’ the state, to end the ‘dependency culture’ and to reduce taxation, public
expenditure steadily rose in real terms between 1979-80 and 1986-7” (Lowe,
1993: 309). Examining specifically the development within social security and
personal social services, Lowe (1993: 318) concludes that “on the best evidence
available, however, it is clear that the radical ideas of both the 1970s and the
1980s were disappointed”.
So, viewed from some distance, the Thatcher (and Major) years cannot
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adequately be described as a process of dismantling the welfare state in Britain,
which we learnt from Lowe and which is also reflected in the scholarship pre-
sented in the book The State of Welfare from 1990, which collects the research of
11 scholars on the development of welfare in Britain since 1974 (Hills, 1990).
Julian Le Grand starts out by describing the apparent paradox that confronts us
here:
… Some people may have come to this work [the book] expecting to find a
chronicle of decline. Nor would such an expectation have been unreasonable.
It would have been plausible to suppose that a combination of the economic
difficulties encountered by Labour government in the 1970s and the ideologi-
cal hostility to welfare of the Conservative government in the 1980s had led to
a sharp diminution of the welfare state and, in consequence, to an increasing
marginalization of public welfare. Yet more seriously, this would have been
accompanied by damaging changes in welfare ‘outcomes,’ including falls in the
average levels of key indicators of welfare and perhaps also increasing inequali-
ties in those indicators. There are indeed important parts of the welfare state
which show the expected pattern of decline. But the overall picture is rather
different…. In absolute terms, therefore, so far from there being a decline,
there was a rise [in public welfare expenditure from 1974 to 1988]—indeed, at
over a third, a significant one…there is no evidence to support a story of seri-
ous decline. (Le Grand, 1990: 338-40)
One significant change to be recorded for this period is that the relative
increase in welfare expenditure and the rate of increase which had characterized
the post World War Two situation stopped around 1976. Since then welfare
expenditure has taken up the same share of the GDP: around 25 percent. Le
Grand (1990: 344) analyses the development in expenditure for various cate-
gories of welfare provision and tries to relate it to estimates of ‘need’ most often
represented by demographical indicators and concludes that “trends in expendi-
ture seem to have followed trends in needs.” The explanation he offers is the
middle class-thesis, i.e. that areas that have the interest of the middle class devel-
oped the most. Turning to an evaluation of the development of welfare out-
comes over this period of time, the conclusion is that there has been steady
improvement (Le Grand, 1990: 347-50).
Based on these sources we should conclude that the change in welfare pro-
vision during the Conservative reign has been one of organizing welfare. It is no
longer self-evident that the public sector must regulate, finance and provide all
welfare services. Especially incorporating private firms in the provision was a
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significant and major change; but it was not a change leading to a dismantling of
welfare security for citizens on the whole. “No matter how dramatic it might
have seemed to observers (not to mention end-users) on the spot, the shift from
Beveridge-style liberal universalism to post-Thatcher-style liberal stakeholder-
ship was arguably not that great” (Finer, 1999: 29). Ideologically, the
Conservatives paved the way for a welfare mix-approach to social policy, an
approach which has been continued by the New Labour government under
Tony Blair. Blair (1998: iii) wrote, “[w]e want to rebuild the system around work
and security. Work for those who can; security for those who cannot,” introduc-
ing the blueprint for reforming the British welfare state in 1998. Welfare reform
is viewed as part of a larger picture in which Britain should become a “model of
the 21st century developed nation” premised on  sound and stable economic
development, with dynamic enterprises, the best educated workforce in the
world, and “a welfare state that promotes our aims and achievements” (Blair,
1998: iii). 
This document entails a strong belief in a welfare mix approach to the wel-
fare state as is clear from the following quote:
It is clear that while the state has a crucial role to play in the provision of finan-
cial welfare, employers, private sector, private-sector financial institutions,
trade unions, mutual organisations and friendly societies are all important
partners…Voluntary organisations are also a vital part of the welfare mix [sic!],
either providing services alone or in partnership with government. Historically,
voluntary provision has led and encouraged government provision. Today,
government and the voluntary sector act in unison to maximize help for those
in need. Charities, good neighbour schemes and credit unions all make an
enormous contribution to society. (Blair, 1998: 15-6)
The Third Way welfare policy focuses on: activation and individualism, but
also on fighting (child) poverty and increasing female labor participation. Thus,
productivist elements can be identified, but the development does not qualify
for being termed neoliberal.
Continental Europe: A frozen welfare landscape or simultaneous reductions and
improvements of welfare entitlements?
According to a study directed by Maurizio Ferrera at  the end of the 1990s,
the major reason for welfare reform in Continental Europe was unsustainable
pension systems, “[t]o a large extent, the crisis of the welfare state is the crisis of
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social insurance (pensions)” (Ferrera and Rhodes, 2000b: 265). Analyzing pen-
sion reforms ten years later, Frericks, Maier and de Graaf found tendencies both
toward privatization and solidarity: 
We propose the thesis that the current developments cannot be satisfyingly
grasped by a neoliberal or neoetastic perspective, but must be interpreted as
representing a new mix of the dynamic state-market relationship. This mix
combines the stick of the market with the carrot of (equalizing) state interven-
tions, where they are not seen as separate and in opposition but as co-produc-
tive for so-called public-private arrangements. (Frericks, Maier and de Graaf,
2009: 138)
Among the neoliberal reform measures they identify: the introduction of
private pension schemes; more space for private financial institutions (banks
etc.); and a stronger individualization of obligations and entitlements. Among
neoetatistic reform measures they identify: strict new regulations for pension
funds; and the linking of some pension rights  to education and/or periods of
care, meaning that in those periods of time pension ‘points’ are earned even if
the persons are not working. Studying not only the practices of pension reform
in Europe but also the discourses surrounding them, they found that “the two
different and classically alternative perspectives [of neoliberalism and
neoetatism] partly intersect” (Frericks, Maier and de Graaf, 2009: 145). Examining
the case of Germany it is concluded that “it is prototypical for its blending of
private and public elements and for its paying attention to life course aspects of
caring within this blending” (Frericks, Maier and de Graaf, 2009: 147).
The overall conclusion is that we are witnessing the development of a new
form of social citizenship resting on a welfare mix approach, which contains pri-
vate as well as public elements:
Citizens’ obligations and entitlements are being redefined in the sense that
behavior which apparently supports long-term developments of society as
such, is rewarded thus, resting on a more holistic understanding of responsibil-
ities one could speak of a kind of anthropological system-sustaining citizen-
ship. By this we mean that the shift in welfare regimes can be seen as aiming at
the transformation of the ‘protection’ of citizens-in-need because of unem-
ployment, sickness, education, or age to the ‘activation’ of citizens as individu-
ally participating in and being responsible for the risks and opportunities of
the current society. Citizenship is thus not defined in terms of acquired status,
but as the possible or actual differentiated contribution to society. We would
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propose the concept of the ‘productive citizen’ to delineate this new form of
citizenship. (Frericks, Maier, and de Graaf, 2009: 151-152)
Regarding applying the concepts of neoliberalism and its presumed oppo-
sition, neoetatism, these authors conclude that it is not very ‘fruitful’ even if ele-
ments of both can be found. They have convincingly shown, at least in the case
of pension reform, that the real picture is much more complex. So, to them it is
not either or, but both at the same time, “[t]he important feature of the new
mix is precisely the coupling of public and private means, also with according
forms of governance, as constituting a new form of citizenship” (Frericks, Maier
and de Graaf, 2009: 153). This is in line with Stephan Leibfried and Herbert
Obinger (2003: 209)’s analysis of German welfare reform, where they found that
“no consistent pattern of reform can be found”; rather “beginning in the mid-
1980s, retrenchment was accompanied by selective welfare state expansion,
focused first on family policy.”
A similar observation is made by Daniel Clegg when analyzing welfare
reform in Continental Europe with respect to unemployment benefits. Focusing
especially on the Dutch case he found that “the reform path has been complicat-
ed, not to say confused” (Clegg, 2007: 609). Yet, he did find an overall pattern in
the changes considering Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and France: 
Generally, policies have enhanced protection for ‘insiders’ while targeting both
benefit cuts and new activation initiatives on ‘outsiders.’ After a quarter century
of reforms these are thus neither fully activating nor fully compensatory wel-
fare states… There is a suggestive parallel—and probably a two-way causal
link—here with the dualism of labor market regulation increasingly found in
much of Continental Europe, where precarious employment contracts have
been expanded as ‘exceptions’ that simultaneously contradict and reinforce the
‘rule’ of standard employment. (Clegg, 2007: 613)
What we are witnessing here is also reflected in the discussion of so-called
flexicurity, which is a combination of flexible labor markets (read: no job pro-
tection) and generous welfare provisions facilitated by active labor market poli-
cies. Originally a Scandinavian and Dutch affair, it is now being promoted
across Europe by international organizations such as the European Commission
and the OECD. Elke Viebrock and Jochen Clasen (2009: 307) suggested that
“flexicurity policies might be characterized as a form of synchronization of eco-
nomic and social policy, as a post-de-regulation alternative.” They also charac-
terize it as a ‘third way’ strategy between traditional liberal labor markets of the
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Anglo-Saxon countries and the strict job security of Continental and Southern
European countries. 
Clegg endorsed the perspective promoted by Wolfgang Streeck and
Kathleen Thelen (2005) of “incremental change with transformative results.”
Changes have not been of the ‘big bang’ kind, but even if they are small and
piecemeal, they nevertheless form a pattern over time (see also Hall and Thelen,
2009). In this case the pattern has been an increasing marginalization of immi-
grants, refugees and other ethnic minorities; and a large proportion of youth
and people with substandard productivity due to bad health, handicap or
degrees of invalidity; while the super fit core workers enjoy enhanced entitle-
ments. However, these processes of polarization and marginalization do not
necessarily spill over into increased inequalities and rising poverty rates, at least
not in the Dutch case as demonstrated by Anthony Annett (2006).
The overall conclusion is that welfare reform has been aimed at adjusting
entitlements to conditions of post-industrialism; changes have been incremental
with some retrenchment concerning weaker segments and some improvements
concerning core groups of citizens (Bonoli, 2007; Rothgang, Obinger, Leibfried,
2006).
Southern Europe: Public Health Care and Guaranteed Minimum Income
Both Southwestern and Southeastern Europe are the least developed areas
when it comes to welfare state provisions and interventions. These regions con-
tain the laggards and latecomers, who have the strongest reliance on family net-
works and voluntary organizations in Europe. Yet, the development has general-
ly been one of expansion and universalization, even if it had a late start. This
sub-section briefly considers the Southwestern Europe’s development with an
eye toward health care and guaranteed minimum income schemes.
With the installation of democratic rule succeeding the military dictator-
ships, social citizenship rights saw rapid expansion in Southern Europe.
Different paths have been chosen in different fields, but in the case of health
care, the four South European states, during the 1980s, chose to develop univer-
sal public health care systems as Ana Guillén (2002) has informed us. More
recently, however, these already mature systems have been undergoing reform,
at least in Greece and Spain; and the literature point to some problems of e.g.
regional inequality, insufficient coverage and so forth (Petmesidou and Guillén,
2008). Particularly concerning the Greek case, there seems to be strong veto
actors at play, hence drawing a picture more of a stalled reform process than of a
radical one. Thus, Athanasios Nikolentzos and Nicholas Mays (2008: 174) assert
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that: 
…, the empirical research to date strongly supports the argument that health
care reform in Greece is path-dependent because the parliamentary and gov-
ernment process allows the main actors in the system, such as hospital doctors
and university doctors, to shape any reforms so as to maintain the status quo.
The role of institutions is crucial in explaining this and, in particular, explain-
ing the development of Greek society, the resultant nature of the Greek state
and the related peculiarities of its welfare state. The brief history of the three
periods of recent system reforms shows how vested interests (such as the trade
unions of already privileged groups) and the medical profession (junior hospi-
tal doctors, senior hospital doctors and university doctors) have been able to
exploit party-to-person clientelism.
A similar argument is made with reference to pension reforms in all four
South European countries by Carrera Leandro, Angelaki Marina, and Carolo
Daniel (2009: 1): 
Thus, while Italy has been able to adopt more path-breaking reforms that ulti-
mately reduced the generosity of the public pension system significantly while
enhancing the role of the second pillar, reform in Spain has been more modest
although the measures adopted have helped strengthen the financial sustain-
ability of the first public pillar. Meanwhile, pension reform efforts have largely
stalled in Portugal and Greece, and recent reforms have only been approved
after providing significant concessions to the labor movement. 
A third social policy area which has undergone considerable analysis is that
of guaranteed minimum income schemes. Leonor Vasconcelos Ferreira (2008:
67-68) offers this critical evaluation: 
New developments in social policy were introduced in South European coun-
tries in the late 1990s, especially through centre-left governments (Guillén and
Matsaganis, 2000; Matsaganis et al., 2003)… As a consequence of these new
political ideas, there has been a clear review of the social policy agenda with an
increase in and restructuring of social expenditures in Southern Europe… pro-
grammes of income support and activation, such as minimum income
schemes, were introduced in several Spanish regions during the 1990s and
nationwide in Portugal in 1997; however, the programmes lasted only a few
years in Italy and were never implemented in Greece.
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Such programs, though, have been continued on a local and experimental
basis in Italy (Kazepov and Sabatinelli, 2002; Ferrera, 2008). So, even if they are
not making reference to an overall national legislation, they must nevertheless
be considered an improvement of social citizenship entitlements in Italy and
Spain; and in Portugal there is now a national obligation toward the integration
of marginalized citizens. However, Greece is still trailing behind. In a compari-
son with Cyprus, Gabriel Amitsis (2009: 1) stated: 
The major difference between the Greek and the Cypriot social welfare regimes
lies in the treatment of needy/socially excluded persons by the public sector.
Greece does not provide for a social safety net (in the form of a general guaran-
teed minimum income scheme)… The second major difference corresponds
to the application of active inclusion policies for welfare claimants/beneficia-
ries. Greece has not introduced a concerted policy in the national welfare agen-
da.
The very low priority to welfare provision in Greece probably partly
explains the youth protests during the winter of 2008 and that of 2009.
Finally, the near absence of public care arrangements in the south must be
mentioned briefly since they aggravate the future constraints on these societies.
The increasingly unfavorable ratio between those of working age and the elderly
is increasing because of very low fertility rates; this low fertility equilibrium, as it
is in Germany (Leibfried and Obinger, 2003: 203), is associated with the lack of
care facilities other than totally private ones. Hence, Henjak (2008: 191) cites
Francis Castles for the opinion that “visibly lower fertility rates in those coun-
tries [of Southern Europe] are mainly due to the lack of suitable child care and
flexible work arrangements for working parents”. It is only certain middle class
groups that can afford to employ a Latin American or Eastern European care-
taker, which is the otherwise common solution. It has proven impossible to keep
women away from the labor market, but since they still have the main responsi-
bility of  caring for children and frail parents, they postpone and reduce child-
bearing (Bifulco and Vitale, 2006; Da Roit, Bilan and Österle, 2007; Pfau-
Effinger, 2005).
The South European welfare states may still be incomplete; but the devel-
opment has certainly been one of expansion, and not of retrenchment.
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Scandinavia: Incremental Changes in Different Directions2
The 20th Century has seen the emergence,
massive expansion, maturation, and, subsequently,
the crisis of systems of social protection
in the Nordic and the other European countries.
The current crisis has financial,
ideological and political dimensions.
(Palme, 1999: 13)
Generally, fundamental features
of the Nordic welfare state...remain,
for the most part, intact.
(Swank, 2000: 114)
There is widespread agreement that Scandinavian welfare states have
changed during the 1990s, but many observers have focused more on their
resilience to change; i.e. changes have not, overall, been viewed as paradigmatic.
“In the past twenty years the Nordic welfare states have overcome a sea of
changes in family structures and labor markets, and even demonstrated a
remarkable ability to survive through periods of dramatic economic turmoil…”
(Kautto et al., 2001: 271; see e.g. also Nordlund, 2000; 2002). Yet, others have
pointed to the mounting evidence of the introduction of elements otherwise
characteristic of the Atlantic, the Continental, and even the Southern European
model, “[g]overnment ability to control and command are now being chal-
lenged by an unclear horizontal and vertical separation of powers, regionaliza-
tion and globalization, decentralization and devolution, and the involvement of
nongovernmental units in the policy steering process (i.e. governance)”
(Micheletti, 2001: 265). What is evident is that both Finland and Sweden experi-
enced negative growth during the mid-1990s, and with the exception of
Norway, the Nordic countries have not expanded welfare provision in relative
terms.
When defining the Scandinavian model of welfare, the issue of universal-
ism is central. Is welfare in Scandinavia more dependent upon residency than
on having the status of a worker? The answer is still: yes! But it is less so than
before. In all of the four Scandinavian countries, access to social insurance bene-
fits has been restricted and the divide between members of the middle class and
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marginalized groups has increased. Elements of individualization, decentraliza-
tion, more reliance on family and kin, and market solution are pushing
Scandinavia closer to principles governing the other European Union welfare
models.
In the general understanding, the Scandinavian model has been considered
not only universal, but also comprehensive; both elements indicating that these
welfare states are big spenders. Indeed, the Scandinavian welfare states are big
spenders, but not bigger than other Northwestern European welfare states as
demonstrated above. Spending in relative terms is at par with the situation in
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Furthermore,
the trend in expenditure levels is toward a catch-up convergence since those
countries spending the least have the highest growth rates;  the all- time big
spender—Sweden—has not expanded during the 1990s (although it was pub-
licly announced that “the cuts in the welfare system have been completed”
(NOSOSCO, 1998: 15).
Another feature of Scandinavia is a high degree of reliance on general taxa-
tion for financing welfare provision. Here, the trend is that contributions are
increasing and tax shares are decreasing; yet the public sector still picks up the
lion’s share; but—perhaps—more importantly: financing is politically decided
by the parliaments and not negotiated between the social partners. The parlia-
ments still decide who and with how much welfare should be financed; but the
growth in occupational pensions in Denmark is a move towards more Contin-
ental financing.
The Scandinavian model was characterized by a high degree of public pro-
vision; yet the trend is toward more private insurance and labor market negoti-
ated schemes regarding pensions and additional health insurance; and since the
1980s private hospitals have been introduced (in Denmark). It is also a hallmark
of Scandinavian welfare that personal social services are provided by the munic-
ipalities; but the trend is toward more contracting-out, especially regarding
home care  for the elderly and handicapped (at least in Denmark and Sweden).
Furthermore, both the Danish and the Norwegian governments are strongly
encouraging and financially supporting voluntary service provision (volunteer
centers), while other civil societal institutions such as relatives have  had a bigger
role to play in Sweden regarding old age.
High quality provision was also part of the definition; yet a number of
scandals with regard to care in nursery homes (in Sweden) and in hospitals
(Denmark) indicate the opposite; dissatisfaction with especially the health care
systems is also widespread. In addition, the constant queuing within the sec-
ondary health sector in all of the Scandinavian countries is a sign of a lack of
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quality in the health care system.
High compensation rates have also traditionally been viewed as a hallmark
of the Scandinavian model. But, as demonstrated above, the developments in
compensation rates are nearly all negative, meaning that benefits have become
less generous since the mid-1990s. Social assistance and basic pension are not
able to keep people out of poverty, with compensation less or around 50 percent
of a standard disposable income. Still, the Scandinavian countries are more
(income) egalitarian than any other country in the world; but it is more due to
the working of the tax system and the organizing of the labor market than it is
due to social policies.
Within the areas of health care, pensions and old age and employment
changes of the second and third order have been identified which all point in the
direction of principles and institutions hitherto considered as trademarks of
either the South European model, the reliance on family, networks and volun-
tary organizations, the Continental model, the close embeddedness in the labor
market with its build in tendency of creating a dual structure, and the Atlantic
model with its emphasis on market solutions. Yet, nowhere else is such a large
share of the total population gainfully employed as in Scandinavia, and the
model (under change) still receives strong support from the population accord-
ing to all opinion polls (Andersen et al., 1999). The Scandinavian welfare states
are still distinct, but less so; they are being Europeanized.
The most important third order change is the active turn in welfare policy
in Scandinavia. To some extent unemployment is no longer considered a
macroeconomic problem linked to a downturn in the business cycle, but is asso-
ciated more with insufficient qualifications. Based on this kind of thinking labor
market policies are now focusing on the employability of people. If people are
unemployed they must have their skills upgraded, and that is supposed to hap-
pen with activation measures. However, the most important effect of activation
has proven to be what economists have labeled the “motivation effect” or what
sociologists refer to as the “scare effect”. When unemployed people approach the
time to go into activation, they significantly increase their job search and conse-
quently also their employment. What happens is that they drastically lower their
expectations concerning pay, benefits and relation to their education, distance to
the workplace, etc. (for the Norwegian case, see Lødemel, 2001; for the Danish
case, see Abrahamson, 2009).
Comparative Studies Cross-Cutting the Five Welfare Regimes
Even when the welfare regime approach is accepted, some studies try and
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include developments within all five regimes, usually with reference to OECD or
Eurostat data. A few such studies shall be commented upon here. Peter Taylor-
Gooby (2008) sums up a number of common developments across Europe that
have surfaced in this paper. His reading of the literature leads him to suggest that
Western European welfare states, ‘broadly speaking,’ have developed through
three distinctly different phases: “confident and continuous expansion in the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s; a period of uncertainty and challenge during the late
twentieth century; and more recently, movement toward a new welfare state set-
tlement” (Taylor-Gooby, 2008: 4; emphasis added). He uses the term settlement
to “denote a paradigm shared across a number of significant actors and present-
ed as appropriate to meet identified problems and promote future successful
developments” (Taylor-Gooby, 2008: 4). Key to this new settlement is an under-
standing of the welfare state as productivist. Hence, he labels it the “new social
investment state.” What he identifies is: 
A shift toward a view that the government is to promote national competitive-
ness in an increasingly international market, and away from a passive provid-
ing state to one which seeks to enhance self-activity, responsibility and mobi-
lization into paid work among citizens. Social policy is shifting from social pro-
vision to social investment. (Taylor-Gooby, 2008: 4) 
Others have applied that label too; e.g. Jenson and Saint-Martin (2003) in
the paper where they identified a change toward a stronger emphasis on social
cohesion with regard to welfare policy recommendations (see also Jenson,
2010).
Taylor-Gooby (2008: 11) suggests that this new welfare state settlement
rejects what he calls the “loose monetarist conclusion that welfare states are at
best irrelevant and at worst counter-productive.” Instead it tries to maintain the
usual range of popular mass services, but with a continued pressure for cost-effi-
ciency. Here, the emphasis is on welfare as social investment, and no longer on
welfare as a burden on the economy. He finds that such a productivist interpre-
tation of the welfare state is promoted both by the EU, the OECD, and among
main national governments (in Europe). Flexicurity is one element in this pro-
ductivist interpretation of the welfare state, and with it a stronger emphasis on
activation, but more through benefit redesign than actual positive support for
mobility between jobs (Taylor-Gooby, 2008). He sums up thus: 
De-regulation; policies to make work more attractive for those on low wages;
cutbacks in passive benefit schemes that do not require recipients to pursue
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jobs, such as early retirement or job-creation; greater use of regulated social
assistance and case management; specific programs for high-risk groups
(young low-skilled people, single-parents); and more child-care, particularly
for those on low incomes. (Taylor-Gooby, 2008: 13)
Taylor-Gooby (2008: 19-20) identified those main supporters of this new
welfare settlement to be governments concerned about  maintaining competi-
tiveness and business interests, while the resistance has come from the labor and
trade union movements—particularly in Continental and Southern Europe:
In short, the general direction in Europe has been toward a decline in the influ-
ence of labor in relation to employers’ interests. The outcome has been that it is
the negative activation rather than the positive social investment in research
and development and in supporting labor mobility that has tended to predom-
inate in policy. The new social investment strategy is much more prominent in
policy debates and discussions at the European level than in what emerge in
policy in individual countries. (Taylor-Gooby, 2008: 20)
He concludes by suggesting that “European countries have some way to go
in achieving a new welfare state settlement that fully reconciles economic and
social goals” (Taylor-Gooby, 2008: 21).
In an equally important paper, Giuliano Bonoli (2007) points to the
importance of the time dimension. His main thesis is that initially welfare state
provisions developed as a response to risks associated with industrial societies,
and that the change to postindustrialism has happened at significantly different
times in different areas of Europe, which in turn has led to different conditions
for welfare state adoption. He claims that social risks have changed considerably
from industrial to postindustrial society. He also asserted that “the postwar wel-
fare state was protected well against the risk of being unable to extract an
income from the labor market, be it because of sickness, invalidity, old age, or
lack of unemployment” (Bonoli, 2007: 496). It did so by granting entitlements
to the male breadwinner and relied on stable family relations and a clear divi-
sion between husband and wife. However, with postindustrialisation, things
have changed dramatically and the new social risks include precarious employ-
ment, long-term unemployment, being a working poor, single parenthood, or
an inability to reconcile work and family life. “Broadly speaking, the Nordic and
some English-speaking countries…have been the first set of countries to enter
the postindustrial age in the 1970s. They were followed by Continental
European countries about a decade later and by Southern Europe even later”
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(Bonoli, 2007: 511). Furthermore:
Whether countries manage or fail to reorient their welfare state in a way that
reflects changed socio-economic circumstances, they depend on the relative
timing of key socioeconomic trends in interaction with existing welfare state
structures. The key developments are postindustrialization and the increase in
the cost of the industrial welfare state resulting from the combination of demo-
graphic aging and generous pension promises. These two developments must
not happen simultaneously if a welfare state is to successfully reorient. (Bonoli,
2007: 512) 
He then demonstrates that the early postindustrializers, which are the
Scandinavian countries, are the ones that have developed the most comprehen-
sive systems of new social risk coverage. He writes that his findings are not good
news for those who are hit by new social risks in Continental and Southern
Europe. “These countries have missed a window of opportunity to reorient
there welfare state. During the next two to three decades, because of population
aging, it will become increasingly difficult to introduce new social policies”
(Bonoli, 2007: 518). Finally, he emphasizes that this perspective on timing
should be considered a complement rather than an alternative to other interpre-
tations of welfare state development.
Two Swedish colleagues, Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme, have promoted
an exception to the resilience and reform perspective. They found that “the long
increase in social rights has been turned into a decline and that significant
retrenchment has taken place in several countries” (Korpi and Palme, 2003:
425). Particularly, they found that “the British welfare state has been rolled back
to a pre-Beveridge level, at or below that of the 1930s” (Korpi and Palme, 2003:
433-4). The apparent contradictory findings within social science literature on
recent changes within European welfare states can, however, be explained by
being more precise about what programs are being considered and what time
span is being investigated. Korpi and Palme analyzed the net worth of compen-
sation in cases of unemployment, sickness and work accidents from 1975 to
1995 and found the strongest case for retrenchment regarding unemployment
insurance (see also Korpi, 2003). This is not incompatible with the view that,
generally speaking, there has been little or no retrenchment within European
welfare states. In EU-27 in 2006 unemployment compensation only took up 5.4
percent of the total social expenditure (Eurostat, 2009b: 5). Furthermore, some
programs, notably unemployment insurance and social assistance, were subject-
ed to cut-backs in the 1980s and 1990s—the period investigated by Korpi and
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Palme; but if, for instance, pension and health care rights are not cut back and
when family policies are being expanded, then the general picture is one of
resilience to change rather than one of retrenchment.
Furthermore, Korpi has pointed out that one very important element in
the post WW II social settlement, the commitment to full employment, has
been given up and he views this as an significant retrenchment of social rights
(Korpi, 2003: 589). What can safely be concluded concerning this period of
uncertainty is that the social settlement that underpinned the golden age was
changed.
Finally, a few words on the potential influence of EU membership on wel-
fare state developments in Europe. As Tolga Bolukbasi (2009: 529) wrote,
“[t]here exists a broad agreement in the political economy literature on the view
that the EMU [Economic and Monetary Union] project represents the final
stage in the process of institutionalization of neoliberalism across Europe.” The
argument was that the strict convergence criteria made it impossible for the
member states to maintain high levels of public intervention. Instead a race to
the bottom regarding welfare provision was to be expected. However, as demon-
strated above, that has not happened. In addition, “new empirical evidence
showed that while welfare states were in a constant process of transformation,
these could not, even during the trials and tribulations of the convergence peri-
od, be characterized by downright retrenchment” (Bolukbasi, 2009: 528). He
concluded that “[a]lthough the jury is still out over the future impact of EMU, a
scenario of across-the-board retrenchment seems most unlikely in the foresee-
able future” (Bolukbasi, 2009: 528). 
So much to economic integration. When it comes to the so-called social
dimension, the EU has long ago adopted a policy that does not involve the har-
monization of social policy legislation. Instead the term applied is coordination.
Space does not allow a thorough discussion of this dimension, which I have
dealt with at length elsewhere (Abrahamson, 2007). A few conclusions must suf-
fice. A number of decisions by the European Court of Justice have considerably
widened the scope of social entitlements within the EU in the sense of categories
of citizens that have such entitlements. What used to be rights for only (male)
workers have gradually been extended to spouses, part-time workers, students
and pensioners. But the court has not ruled on the level of benefits. Furthermore,
most regulation, with the important exception of the social protection of
migrant workers, which is regulated by Regulation 1408, is soft law initiatives
such as recommendations, solemn declarations, resolutions, and the most
recent so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC). This is a policy instru-
ment whereby the heads of states or governments in the bi-annual meetings in
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the European Council decide upon some common goals sometimes accompa-
nied by tangible benchmarks such as in the case of the fight against social exclu-
sion from the 2000 Lisbon summit. The member states must then file a report
to the Commission explaining how they expect to meet the common goals, but
they can apply any means—hence, leaving the different welfare regimes intact.
After a designated period of time the Commission will collect reports on the
progress made within each member state. The only sanctions are ‘shaming and
blaming,’ parallel to OECD’s publication of rankings of its member states with
respect to various performances (See further Haverland, 2007; Murphy, 2005).
The Greek case is illustrative of how little real influence the EU institutions have
on national decision-making in the social area. Despite the signing of various
recommendations and participation in the OMC, virtually nothing has hap-
pened in the development of social entitlements in Greece. Whether the newly
appointed PASOK government (fall 2009) will make a difference remains to be
seen. But the conditions attached to the recent bailout of the Greek state’s colos-
sal deficit make it unlikely that social entitlements will be improved under the
conditions of reducing the public sector expenditure.
Conclusion 
One of the findings that continues to emerge
in the body of work focusing on welfare state reform
is that reform is politically risky and difficult.
(Vis, 2009: 31)
Despite double the amount of pressure from globalization and Europeani-
zation, European welfare states have not embarked on a race to the bottom. On
the contrary, measured by social spending and the assessment of major pro-
grams, social citizenship has been strengthened and expanded over the last three
decades; however, this does not mean that the welfare state has been resilient to
change as assumed by some of the literature. European welfare states have
indeed been reformed during the period of globalization and some significant
changes have occurred in comparison with the golden age. The old welfare state
settlement, for example, with its commitment to full employment, has been
given up; also, unemployment insurance has largely changed its scope from
compensating income loss in bad times to forcefully manipulate individuals’
skills to better match current labor market conditions. Additionally, a more plu-
ralistic risk management has developed by involving more sectors in a welfare
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mix approach, thereby leaving more room for private, market and civil societal
solutions; but the state is still in charge of regulation and to a large extent also
the financing of the social entitlements.
From a discourse-analytic perspective it is important to differentiate the era
of globalization into the period of uncertainty of the 1980s and 1990s and the
period of after-neoliberalism of the 2000s and beyond. Indeed the period of
time following the first oil chock of the 1970s was a neoliberal era, which mani-
fested itself very tangibly within areas such as the industrial sector, and financial
policy as convincingly demonstrated by many contributions to this issue
(Chandrasekhar, 2010; Chang, 2009; Fine, 2009; Masina, 2009; Saad-Filho,
2010). Rhetorically, this was also a neoliberal time regarding the prospects of
welfare state development with a strong emphasis on issues such as privatiza-
tion, marketization, retrenchment and increased individual responsibility.
International organizations such as the OECD led the way, and in Europe, gov-
ernments such as the one in the UK and the ones in Central and Eastern Europe
adopted this new policy paradigm. On the ground, however—seen from the
perspective of social citizenship rights and obligations—the commitment to
state guaranteed entitlements survived and was gradually expanded. With the
2000s a new welfare state settlement entitled the social investment state emerged
with an emphasis on active citizenship and the productive citizen.
At closer look, developments have diverged among different welfare
regimes and among different policy areas. Western Continental and Southern
Europe have proven most resilient to change, while the opposite is true for the
Scandinavian and Atlantic regimes; but they have all, including Central and
Eastern Europe, expanded their public commitment to safeguarding the welfare
of citizens. Yet, the development has been uneven among policy areas. Seen
from the perspective of entitlements, health care is a public matter in Europe,
and in Southwestern Europe, it became so during the era of neoliberalism; how-
ever, the introduction of the so-called new public management governance
techniques imported from the market sector was introduced. Regarding old age
pensions, rights have been expanded and have remained a collective, non-mar-
ket regulated area, even when elements have been commodified. The same goes
for care services for the elderly, albeit many of these are now delivered by the pri-
vate sector working under contract with local and regional authorities. Family
policies, especially policies enabling a better balance between family and work,
have been expanded significantly except in Southern Europe, while unemploy-
ment insurance and social assistance programs have been cut significantly. This
uneven development explains, in part, why the social science literature has been
in such disagreement about welfare state development under neoliberalism and
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beyond as the focus has been on different policies during different times and in
different places.
Given these different developmental trends regarding time, space and poli-
cy it is no easy task to try and summarize the state of the art of the contempo-
rary European welfare state, but some generalizations shall be offered. International
organizations are no longer advocating a neoliberal approach to state interven-
tion, but that has not meant a return to the post WW II social settlement. Instead
the social investment state is being promoted and implemented with its empha-
sis on the productive and active citizen. 
As we learned from Frericks, Maier and de Graaf (2009: 152), citizenship is,
“…not defined in terms of acquired status, but as the possible or actual differen-
tiated contribution to society”. (For an alternative interpretation of active citi-
zenship, see Haahr, 1997: 8; Jansen, Chioncel, Dekkers, 2006) So-called activa-
tion policies feature prominently in this new welfare state architecture; originat-
ing in Sweden this approach has now spread to most, if not all, European states
and beyond. It has meant a significant change of scope concerning unemploy-
ment and social assistance benefits by focusing on the employability of the indi-
vidual unemployed citizen instead of only compensating for his or her income
loss. Ideally, activation strives at enhancing the qualifications of unemployed
individuals by providing them with some kind of job training or education; but
by doing so, it, in reality, tests their employability and sorts them out according-
ly. Hence, activation acts as a tool of marginalization by sorting the unemployed
into various categories of invalids: long-term sick, handicapped, disabled, etc. to
the extent the individuals in question do not succeed with their activation mea-
sure. Furthermore, activation is obligatory, and one loses the right to their bene-
fits if an offer is refused. This has led to the so-called scare or motivation effect
being the most significant effect of activation: when claimants approach the date
for going into activation they strongly increase their job search and significantly
lower their job expectations regarding the sector, pay, and distance to work etc.
To a large extent, they do find employment; however, it is usually much below
their otherwise expected level and standard.
Thus, one price that has been paid for the active turn in social policy and
the productive citizen is a high degree of marginalization of various categories of
people such as ethnic minorities, youth, people with disabilities, etc. Processes of
marginalization are accompanied by strong trends toward a dualization of wel-
fare entitlements and provisions with relatively generous benefits for the well-
integrated productive middle class citizens on the one hand, and on the other
hand, reduced and punitive provisions for the increasing number of marginal-
ized people.
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